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The Economics of Currency 
Crises and Contagion:
An Introduction
• Traditional models of currency crises suggest 
that weak or unsustainable economic policies 
are the cause of exchange rate instability. 
These models provide a partial explanation of 
the Asian currency crisis, but they cannot 
account for its severity.
• A more comprehensive view of the turmoil in 
Asia takes into account the interaction of 
policy and volatile capital markets. Weak 
policy makes a country vulnerable to abrupt 
shifts in investor confidence; the sudden rise 
of investor expectations of a crisis can force a 
policy response that validates the original 
expectations.
• Two additional factors help explain the 
severity of the Asia crisis: inadequate 
supervision of the banking and financial 
sectors in the affected countries and the rapid 
transmission of the crisis through structural 
links and spillover effects among the 
countries.
he 1990s witnessed several episodes of currency turmoil, 
most notably the near-breakdown of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-93, the Latin American 
Tequila Crisis following Mexico’s peso devaluation in 1994-95, 
and the severe crisis that swept through Asia in 1997-98.1 
However, the economic effects of this exchange rate instability 
have been especially devastating in Asia. Following years of stellar 
performances, the crisis-hit countries of Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea experienced a 
plunge in the external value of their currencies and a sudden 
reversal of private capital flows from June 1997 onward. Investors 
had poured massive amounts of funds into the Asian countries 
until the first half of 1997, then drastically reversed the pattern in 
the summer, as “hot money” flowed out at a staggering pace. The 
ensuing $100 billion net capital outflow represented a sizable 
shock to the region, accounting for 10 percent of the combined 
GDP of the five crisis-hit countries.
International economists and policy analysts attempting to 
explain the severity of recent currency and financial crises 
face a major challenge. These episodes have generated 
considerable—and a finely balanced—debate over whether 
currency and financial instability can be attributed to arbitrary 
shifts in market expectations and confidence, or to weakness in 
economic fundamentals.
To advance the discussion of currency crises, this article 
presents an introduction to the economic analyses of the crises. 
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T4 The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion
We begin by discussing the so-called first generation of 
models, in which crises are viewed in the literature as the 
unavoidable result of unsustainable policies or fundamental 
imbalances. Next, we survey the literature on the second 
generation of models, which highlights the possibility of self-
fulfilling exchange rate crises. We then turn to two key aspects 
of recent crisis episodes that were not fully addressed in 
earlier models— namely, the role of the banking and financial 
sectors and the issue of “contagion,” which is the 
transmission of a crisis across countries. We conclude by 
proposing a synthesis of the different views and applying it to 
the Asia crisis. We contend that far from being mutually 
exclusive, contrasted approaches complement each other by 
painting a comprehensive picture of the recent upheavals: the 
fundamental imbalances stressed by first-generation models 
make a country vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment; 
once a crisis does occur, the second-generation models 




In the literature on exchange rate instability, one approach—
often referred to as first-generation or exogenous-policy 
models—views a currency crisis as the unavoidable outcome of 
unsustainable policy stances or structural imbalances. 2  This 
view stresses that the exchange rate regime is a component of a 
broader policy package, and the regime can be sustained only if 
it does not conflict with other monetary and fiscal objectives. 
The ability of a country to cover its current account deficits by 
generating sufficient export earnings in the future is also a 
major factor affecting the viability of an exchange rate regime, 
according to the first-generation view.
Consider a country with an expansionary monetary policy 
and a fixed exchange rate. In this economy, the defense of the 
exchange rate peg will lead to a depletion of foreign reserves 
held by the domestic central bank. More precisely, the rate of 
domestic credit expansion is bound to exceed the growth in 
demand for the domestic currency. Agents who are 
accumulating excess liquidity prefer to exchange domestic 
currency for foreign-denominated securities or domestic 
interest-bearing assets. Both scenarios lead to a depreciation of 
the domestic currency. In the former case, pressures stem 
directly from increased demand for foreign securities. In the 
latter, domestic bond prices will rise and their yields will fall, 
leading market participants to sell domestic securities and buy 
higher yielding foreign assets. Since the domestic central bank 
is committed to keeping the exchange rate fixed, it must 
accommodate the increased demand for foreign currency by 
reducing its foreign reserves. In sum, the process of domestic 
credit expansion translates into a loss of reserves.
At first glance, we would expect the stock of foreign reserves 
to fall over time. When the reserves are exhausted, the central 
bank would have no choice but to let the domestic currency 
float. A key insight of the first-generation model, however, is 
that the exhaustion of reserves takes the form of a sudden 
depletion, instead of a gradual running down of the stock. 
Acting in anticipation of an exchange rate depreciation, market 
participants liquidate their domestic currency holdings while 
the stock of foreign reserves held by the central bank is still 
relatively large. In the context of this model, a currency crisis 
takes the form of a speculative attack and a stock-shift portfolio 
reshuffling occurs as soon as agents can confidently expect a 
non-negative return on speculation. In such a crisis scenario, 
agents buy the entire stock of foreign reserves that the central 
bank is willing to commit to defend the fixed exchange rate. In 
the aftermath of the speculative attack, the central bank is 
forced to float the currency.
It is easy to interpret this exogenous-policy model in terms 
of an inconsistency between a fixed exchange rate regime and 
domestic fiscal imbalances. In fact, the credit expansion 
described above can be thought of as the result of a fiscal deficit 
monetization by the central bank. From this vantage point, we 
see that the model shows that fiscal imbalances directly 
contribute to a country’s vulnerability to currency crises and 
speculative attacks.
However, there is an important qualification to the above 
analysis. Since a speculative attack is triggered by the market’s 
foresight of an unavoidable depreciation, what matters for the 
analysis are the future policy stances that investors foresee, not 
the ones observed in the past. In other words, the fact that a 
country does not run a sizable fiscal deficit is not a legitimate 
reason to rule out the possibility of a currency crisis. This is 
because the observed fiscal balance may be a poor indicator of 
the effective government net liabilities. To understand this, 
consider a country in which there is no public deficit or debt, 
but whose private sector is subject to a series of shocks that 
threaten corporate and banking profitability. These financial 
difficulties may require the government to bail out troubled 
institutions. Bailout intervention can take different forms, but 
ultimately it has a fiscal nature and it directly affects the 
distribution of income and wealth between financial 
intermediaries and taxpayers. Agents observing the weaknesses 
of the private sector can see that the government will be forced 
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finance the costs of bailout intervention.3 Since such expansion 
is inconsistent with maintaining the exchange rate peg, 
investors will expect the currency to depreciate, and this 
expectation will trigger a speculative attack.
These considerations can be extended to shed light on the 
role of structural imbalances—such as chronic current account 
deficits—in triggering currency crises. A current account 
deficit represents net borrowing from the rest of the world, so 
dependency on foreign sources of capital can put a country in 
a vulnerable position. For example, a deterioration in the 
country’s terms of trade can significantly reduce its ability to 
repay its debt. Foreign investors might then decide not to 
extend lending further. Should the private sector become 
insolvent vis-à-vis its external creditors, the buildup of private 
sector liabilities ultimately becomes a severe burden for the 
public sector. The latter would be asked to rescue private 
institutions as soon as foreign creditors stopped rolling over 
existing debt and called in their loans. The dynamics of a 
currency crisis then follow the same logical steps of the first-
generation model analyzed above. Note that a currency 
devaluation in this framework can help to restore current 
account sustainability by boosting foreign demand for the 
country’s exports.
The above scenario raises the question, under what 
conditions can a current account deficit be unsustainable? A 
country’s ability to generate the funds required to pay off its 
debt is related to its ability to run future trade surpluses. 
Clearly, a deterioration of the export outlook adversely affects 
the ability to repay debt. Such a deterioration can result from 
several factors. For example, domestic inflation can increase 
the price of traded goods and services under a fixed exchange 
rate, leading to a slowdown in exports. A similar loss of 
competitiveness can occur under a fixed exchange rate regime 
when the exchange rate appreciates against important trading 
partners. For example, as the countries affected by the Asia 
crisis were pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar, the 
competitiveness of their exports to Japan suffered from an 
appreciation of the dollar against the yen in the two years 
preceding the crisis.
The sustainability of a current account deficit also depends 
on the use of the borrowed funds. If the deficit finances 
investment projects in the traded sectors, such investment will 
provide a new source of export revenue, thereby generating the 
earnings required to repay the debt. By the same token, a 
current account deficit that finances investment in a nontraded 
sector—such as real estate—or in low-profit projects is less 
sustainable since the return on the investment will not be 




In first-generation interpretations of currency crises, the 
viability, or lack thereof, of an exchange rate peg is determined 
by exogenous fundamentals unrelated to the behavior of 
economic agents. In the model considered above, for instance, 
market participants base their expectations on the pre-
sumption that their actions will not affect fiscal imbalances or 
domestic credit policies. By contrast, the interaction between 
expectations and actual outcomes is at the core of the second-
generation models of crises, in which market expectations 
directly influence macroeconomic policy decisions.4 Such 
models are also referred to as the endogenous-policy approach, 
since policymakers’ actions in these models represent optimal 
responses to macroeconomic shocks.
The key point emphasized in second-generation models is 
that the interaction between investors’ expectations and actual 
policy outcomes can lead to self-fulfilling crises. This point can 
be illustrated by means of a stylized example in which entirely 
different outcomes can occur depending on the agents’ 
expectations. This indeterminacy is at the core of the model’s 
ability to rationalize large market movements, even in the 
absence of corresponding changes in fundamentals.
Consider a country whose monetary authorities are 
committed to maintaining the exchange rate peg, but are willing 
to float their currency under extraordinary circumstances such as 
a sharp cyclical downturn. If the country’s loans from abroad 
were denominated in the borrowing nation’s domestic currency, 
foreign investors would face the possibility of a devaluation of 
that currency, which would reduce the value of their claims. If 
foreign investors considered the possibility of a devaluation to be 
Agents observing the weaknesses of
the private sector can see that the 
government will be forced to adopt an 
expansionary monetary stance in the 
future to finance the costs of bailout 
intervention.6 The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion
very likely, they would charge a high-risk premium on their loans. 
The country’s borrowing costs would rise significantly, reducing 
credit opportunities and curtailing output growth. The country’s 
authorities would then deem the costs of maintaining the peg to 
be too high and choose to devalue their currency to boost 
aggregate demand and employment. The devaluation, in turn, 
would validate the initial investors’ expectations. Ultimately, 
investors’ forecasts are self-fulfilling prophecies: expectations of 
devaluation lead to actions (the risk premium hike) that raise the 
opportunity cost of defending the fixed parity. Therefore, the 
forecasts force a policy response (the abandonment of the peg) 
that validates the original expectations.
Note that the crisis scenario described above is not the only 
possible outcome of our simple model. Consider an 
alternative scenario in which investors do not forecast any 
devaluation and do not charge any risk premium. In this case, 
borrowing costs would remain low and the authorities could 
maintain the exchange rate peg, thereby validating the 
expectations of no devaluation. Our model is then 
characterized by the possibility of multiple outcomes, or 
“equilibria.” All things being equal, there are situations in 
which currency stability is undermined and situations in 
which it is not. A currency crisis can be thought of as a shift in 
expectations toward the devaluation outcome. Such a shift 
suddenly makes the defense of the peg excessively costly.
The main advantage of resorting to such an inter-
pretation of currency crises is the ability to distinguish 
between two kinds of volatility: one related to financial 
markets and one related to macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The former volatility substantially exceeds the latter. Market 
sentiment—in the form of sudden and arbitrary changes in 
market participants’ expectations—then plays a prominent 
role in the determination of a crisis. Exchange rates (and 
other asset prices) are less predictable than they are in 
models with a unique outcome. As a result, second-
generation models are deemed to “square better with the 
stylized facts of global financial markets” (Masson 1999). 
These models, however, do not explain what causes the shifts 
in private agents’ expectations. In other words, the theory 
remains silent on the determinants of the losses of 
confidence that are the cornerstone of the analysis.
Features of Crisis Episodes
Highlighted by the Asian Turmoil
The fundamental and self-fulfilling views of currency crises 
outlined above provide the two main analytical and conceptual 
frameworks in which to interpret cases of currency instability. 
However, it has been argued that these two theories—developed 
before the recent crisis episodes—overlook several features that 
played central roles in the turmoil of the 1990s, especially the 
Asia crisis. We now take a close look at two of these features, 
emphasized in the post-Asia crisis literature—namely, the role of 
the banking and financial sector and the mechanisms of crisis 
transmission across countries, or contagion.
The Banking and Financial Sector
Several recent studies have argued that currency and banking 
crises in emerging markets should be seen as twin events, 
and that the feedback channel between them should be 
investigated.5 In other words, banking and currency crises can 
generate a vicious circle by amplifying each other. Indicators of 
financial strength are therefore crucial when assessing a 
country’s vulnerability to a crisis and the economic impact of 
exchange rate instability. The central role of financial 
institutions also points to the need to supervise and regulate the 
sector, to limit excessive borrowing from abroad, and to reduce 
the risk that temporary liquidity shortages will trigger full-
fledged financial crises. In terms of the distinction between 
fundamental and self-fulfilling views, the role of the banking 
sector spans both approaches. The feedback channel between 
banking and currency crises falls under the fundamental 
approach, as do the health of the financial sector balance sheets 
and the overborrowing syndrome. By contrast, liquidity-driven 
crises in the banking sector reflect the interaction between 
expectations and outcomes.
A currency crisis has an adverse effect on the banking sector 
when banks’ liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency. 
A devaluation suddenly and sharply increases the value, 
expressed in the domestic currency, of these liabilities. As 
banks typically lend domestically in the local currency, a 
devaluation exposes them to a sizable currency mismatch and 
A currency crisis can be thought of as
a shift in expectations toward the 
devaluation outcome. Such a shift 
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a deterioration of their balance sheets.6 In turn, a banking crisis 
can lead to a currency crisis through the burden it imposes on 
the fiscal side of the economy. The cost of addressing the 
consequences of a banking crisis, such as the liquidation of 
insolvent banks, is borne by the public sector. A banking crisis 
is therefore associated with a large, and possibly unexpected, 
worsening of the fiscal position of a country. A drastic change 
in effective public liabilities can trigger expectations of 
monetization of the fiscal deficit and exchange rate 
depreciation. The mechanism is similar to the one in first-
generation models of currency crises stressing the role of 
unsustainable fiscal policies.7
In sum, a country’s vulnerability to currency crises strongly 
depends on the health and stability of its banking sector. The 
strength of financial intermediaries also affects the impact of a 
devaluation on real variables. By worsening the balance sheets 
of financial intermediaries, a devaluation can generate a 
pronounced tightening in credit market conditions, possibly 
leading to a contraction in output. The adverse consequences of a 
devaluation are therefore more severe if banks’ balance sheets are 
plagued with nonperforming loans, or if financial intermediaries 
borrow heavily in foreign currencies at short horizons.
The central role of financial intermediaries has a number of 
important implications. First, microeconomic indicators (such 
as corporate profitability, and debt-to-equity ratios) can help 
predict the imminence and the likelihood of a currency crisis 
better than the standard macroeconomic indicators (such as 
fiscal imbalances and current account deficits). For instance, if 
firms do not scale back their operations when they experience 
a fall in investment profitability, they must resort to external 
financing. To the extent that most of the additional borrowing 
is short-term, debt financing adds to the fragility of the 
corporate sector. From the vantage point of the banking sector, 
low corporate profits and corporate weaknesses result in 
significant shares of nonperforming loans.8
Second, particular attention should be paid to effective 
supervision and regulation of financial intermediaries in the 
process of capital market liberalization. Liberalization 
implemented amid weak supervision can increase a country’s 
vulnerability to external crises by magnifying existing 
distortions and weaknesses. The reduction in borrowing costs 
due to financial deregulation can lead banks and firms to 
borrow extensively in foreign currencies, and funnel the funds 
toward the acquisition of highly risky assets and/or toward the 
financing of low-profit and dubious investment projects. The 
limited ability of the financial regulators to enforce prudential 
rules makes such excessive borrowing possible.
Third, explicit or implicit government guarantees to the 
private sector magnify a moral hazard problem faced by 
financial intermediaries.9 Banks will engage in excessively risky 
borrowing and investment if they expect that the authorities 
will intervene in the event of massive financial distress.10 The 
expectation of financial bailouts can also lead foreign investors 
to lend with little regard to the riskiness of the projects they are 
financing.11 From this vantage point, a fixed exchange rate 
regime is intrinsically unstable and contains the seed of its own 
collapse. This is because the apparent stability of the exchange 
rate peg leads financial intermediaries to overlook currency 
risk, and induces them to borrow heavily in foreign currencies 
without hedging their exposures.12
The central role played by the financial sector in the recent 
turmoil raises the possibility of liquidity-driven crises, as 
opposed to the usual solvency-driven events analyzed in earlier 
models. Chang and Velasco (1998) have stressed the possibility 
of self-fulfilling international liquidity crises and international 
bank runs.13 In an open economy with unrestricted capital 
markets, domestic banks are free to accept deposits from both 
domestic and foreign residents, in both domestic and foreign 
currencies. These liabilities are used primarily to fund longer 
term illiquid investments that cannot be readily converted to 
cash. If bank depositors—both foreign and domestic—
anticipate a speculative run, they will seek to exchange their 
claims on financial institutions for the foreign currency. Banks 
are then forced to liquidate their investments in order to raise 
the cash needed to pay off their depositors. Since investments 
are long-term, they can be liquidated only at highly discounted 
prices. As a result, even a well-managed bank can quickly 
exhaust its cash reserves and become insolvent, thereby validating 
the initial expectation of a run. Because of systemic links, the run 
could spread to the entire banking and financial sector. If such an 
event were to occur, extreme strain on the exchange rate and a 
rapid loss of official reserves are likely to ensue.14
The reduction in borrowing costs due to 
financial deregulation can lead banks and 
firms to borrow extensively in foreign 
currencies, and funnel the funds toward 
the acquisition of highly risky assets and/
or toward the financing of low-profit and 
dubious investment projects.8 The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion
Contagion
A striking aspect of the crises in the 1990s was their occurrence 
across several countries and their fast regional spread. For 
instance, the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 was 
followed by currency crises in Malaysia and Indonesia within a 
month and in Korea a few months later. In the literature, this 
phenomenon is usually—and perhaps mistakenly—referred to 
as contagion.
Various explanations for the transmission of a crisis across 
countries can be offered. First, several countries can be 
similarly affected by a common shock (although a crisis can 
spread even in the absence of such a shock). Trade linkages can 
transmit a crisis, as a currency depreciation in one country 
weakens fundamentals in other countries by reducing the 
competitiveness of their exports. Financial interdependence 
can also contribute to the transmission of a crisis, as initial 
turmoil in one country can lead outside creditors to recall their 
loans elsewhere, thereby creating a credit crunch in other 
debtor countries. Finally, a currency crisis in one country can 
worsen market participants’ perception of the economic 
outlook in countries with similar characteristics and trigger a 
generalized fall in investor confidence. Explanations of the 
international transmission of crises contain elements that fall 
under both the fundamental and the self-fulfilling approaches. 
Common shocks, along with transmission through trade 
channels and common creditors, can be categorized as 
fundamentals-driven crises. By contrast, the role of infor-
mation frictions in capital markets is consistent with the self-
fulfilling view.
The first explanation for the simultaneous occurrence of a 
crisis in different countries holds that the countries are hit by 
common shocks, or display similar elements of domestic 
vulnerability. For instance, several Asian countries shared 
common features such as a high reliance on foreign-
denominated debt and a relatively stable exchange rate against 
the U.S. dollar. The occurrence of a crisis across several 
countries can be seen as an initial disturbance being replicated 
in other places, rather than as the transmission of a shock from 
one country to another.
In the absence of common shocks, a currency crisis can be 
transmitted from one country (A) to another (B) if structural 
links and international spillovers make the economies of 
countries A and B interdependent. That is, if the currency 
devaluation by country A has a negative impact on country B’s 
fundamentals, it will eventually force country B’s currency 
devaluation.
International trade is an obvious candidate for such 
spillover.15 The devaluation by country A reduces the price of 
its goods in foreign markets, leading consumers to purchase 
more goods produced in country A and fewer goods produced 
in other countries, including country B, as they are now 
relatively more expensive. This consumption switching 
adversely affects the sales by firms in country B. The ensuing 
reduction in export earnings can, in turn, significantly hamper 
the ability of country B to sustain a current account deficit, 
which can leave that country’s currency open to attack. 
Country B may then be left with no choice but to devalue its 
currency to sustain its exports since defending it may prove too 
costly in terms of higher interest rates and foreign reserve 
losses.
Interestingly, the international transmission of a currency 
crisis through the trade channel does not rely on large trade 
flows between the two countries. The transmission can occur 
even if countries A and country B do not trade with each other. 
The key feature is that their exports compete in other foreign 
markets. The strength of the transmission mechanism through 
the trade channel depends on the degree to which goods 
produced in different countries are similar to each other (so 
that world demand for goods produced by countries A and B is 
highly sensitive to price differentials). Also, the trade channel is 
especially relevant in the transmission of currency crises when 
countries A and B sell their products in the same markets (see 
Box 1 for an example).
Besides trade links, different countries are interdependent if 
they borrow from the same creditors. Indeed, the central role 
played by capital flows during the Asia crisis suggests that such 
linkages are especially relevant, as discussed in Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000).
A currency crisis in country A reduces the ability of 
domestic borrowers to repay their loans to outside banks. 
Faced with a larger share of nonperforming loans, foreign 
banks rebuild their capital by recalling some of their loans, 
including loans made to borrowers in other countries. 
Borrowers in country B then suffer from a credit crunch caused 
In the absence of common shocks, a 
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by the impact of the currency crisis in country A on their 
creditors. Interestingly, such a recall can generate a regional 
pattern in the credit crunch even if banks recall their loans 
evenly across all countries in their portfolio. The credit crunch 
is sharper in the countries that depend on those banks that 
incurred heavy losses due to the initial crisis, as illustrated in 
Box 2.
Notwithstanding the spillover effects resulting from trade 
linkages or common creditors, a crisis can spread from one 
country to another because of information asymmetries in 
financial markets. Gathering and processing country-specific 
data on a large number of emerging markets is costly. As 
pointed out by Calvo (1999) and Calvo and Mendoza 
(forthcoming), investors may downplay national specificities 
and asymmetries, and consider several countries in a region as 
substantially homogeneous. A new piece of information 
concerning one country can then be extrapolated and applied 
to the entire group. Country-specific events such as a 
devaluation may be perceived as “wake-up” calls leading to a 
generalized reevaluation of investment prospects in the region.
Country A and country B do not trade directly with each other, but 
they export goods to country C and country D. Table 1 presents a 
baseline case in which country B exports mostly to country D,  
whereas country A exports mostly to country C.
The extent to which country B is adversely affected through this 
indirect trade link depends on the weight of country A exports in 
the markets on which country B depends most. In our case, the 
extent of competition between country A and country B is small, as 
they export to different markets. The devaluation by country A has 
only a moderate effect on country B exports, as a 10.0 percent deval-
uation reduces them by 1.8 percent. A technical analysis allows us 
to derive the following relationship between the percentage 
devaluation of country A currency vis-à-vis the currencies of 
countries C and D, DEV, and the percentage reduction in 
country B exports,  :
,
where   is the share of country B exports to market k, 
and   is the market share of goods produced in 
country A in market k.   reflects the degree to which goods 
from countries A and B are substitutable in market k. The 
numerical example assumes that a 10 percent decrease in the 
relative price of goods produced in country A, relative to goods 
produced in country B, leads to a 10 percent increase in the 
demand for goods produced in country A, relative to goods 
produced in country B  .
Table 2 illustrates the impact of a larger market share of country A 
exports in country D. Note that the share of country B exports to 
country D remains unchanged at 90 percent.
In the second example, a 10 percent devaluation by country A 
leads to a 5 percent contraction in country B exports. The con-
traction is sharper because country D relies more on country A 
exports than it does in the first example.
Table 3 illustrates the role of the geographical composition of 
exports. Compared with Table 1, a larger share of country B 
exports goes to country C. Note that the market share of country A 
goods in country C  is unchanged. The impact of the devaluation 
by country A is stronger than in the baseline case, as a 10.0 percent 
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Box 1
Transmission of a Currency Crisis via Trade Channels
Table 1






C D C D Total C D
From A 90 10 90 10 100 90 10
From B 10 90 10 90 100 10 90
  Total 100 100
Note: Country B’s exports fall 1.8 percent following a 10.0 percent 
devaluation of country A’s currency.
Table 2





C D C D Total C D
From A 10 90 10 90 100 50 50
From B 10 90 10 90 100 50 50
  Total 100 100
Note: Country B’s exports fall 5 percent following a 10 percent 
devaluation in country A’s currency.
Table 3





C D C D Total C D
From A 180 5 97 3 100 90 10
From B 20 45 31 69 100 10 90
  Total 100 100
Note: Country B’s exports fall 3.4 percent following a 10.0 percent 
devaluation in country A’s currency.10 The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion
In addition, information costs can lead investors to focus 
their efforts on a small number of countries, leading to the 
emergence of clusters of specialists. This phenomenon can 
cause herding behavior by investors, where the optimal 
investment strategy regarding a specific country involves 
following the lead of the investor most likely to be informed 
of the prospects of that country.
For illustrative purposes, consider two agents investing in 
assets issued by countries A and B. Because of information-
processing costs, the two agents choose to focus their analytical 
efforts on, respectively, country A and country B. Due to her 
limited knowledge of country B, country A’s specialist 
determines the share of country B’s assets in her portfolio by 
replicating the behavior of country B’s specialist. The key 
aspect of such a strategy is that country A’s specialist observes 
the action but not the ultimate motivation of country B’s 
specialist. For instance, a sale of country B’s assets by country 
B’s specialist may be the result of adverse news regarding 
country B, or an investor-specific need for liquidity. In the 
latter case, as country A’s specialist “mimics” the action of 
country B’s specialist, a generalized capital outflow from 
country B occurs, even though there is no deterioration in 
fundamentals.16
We consider a situation in which two financial institutions, say
bank 1 and bank 2, hold a portfolio of loans in three countries: A, 
B, and C. The devaluation by country A reduces the ability of 
borrowers in this country to repay their debts. Banks incur losses, 
as the quality of their portfolio of borrowers from country A is 
reduced. In order to absorb these losses and rebuild their capital, 
the banks have to recall some of their loans to other countries, 
thereby generating a credit crunch.
The table presents a numerical illustration. It shows the 
portfolio of the two banks in the three countries, before the 
devaluation of country A’s currency. For simplicity, we assume 
that all loans to country A are lost, and that each bank has to recall 
loans to countries B and C. It shows that bank 1 has the largest 
exposure to country A, as loans to country A represent 33 percent 
of its predevaluation portfolio, versus 10 percent for bank 2. Bank 1 
therefore recalls 50 percent of its loans in countries B and C, 
whereas bank 2 recalls 11 percent of its loans.
The larger rate of recall by bank 1 is not sufficient by itself to 
generate a geographical spread of the credit crunch: if the share of 
bank 1 in total debt is the same in countries B and C, the extent of 
the credit crunch will also be the same. However, in our example 
country B is more dependent on bank 1 than country C is, as
66 percent of loans to country B represent bank 1 assets, versus
20 percent of loans to country C. Note that the stronger 
dependence on bank 1 in country B does not necessarily lead to a 
different extent of credit crunch across countries. If both bank 1 
and bank 2 were to recall their loans at the same rate, the share of 
loans owed to bank 1 would be irrelevant.
Our example is characterized by a combination of exposure 
differences among banks and dependence differences among 
countries, which lead to a geographical concentration of the credit 
crunch. Country B is more adversely affected than country C, as it 
depends on the bank that was most affected by the initial crisis in 
country A. It is worth stressing that geographical heterogeneity 
does not stem from banks recalling more loans to country B than  
country C. Instead, banks recall all loans worldwide to the same 
extent, and the more severe credit crunch experienced by country B 







Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Total
To  A 20 10 33 10
To  B 20 10 33 10 66 33 100
To  C 20 80 33 80 20 80 100
  Total 100 100
Note: The extent of the credit crunch is 37 percent in country B and
19 percent in country C. The amount of loans recalled by banks 1 
and 2 is 20 and 10, respectively, representing 20/(20 + 20) =
50 percent and 10/(10 + 80) = 11.1 percent of the postdevaluation 
portfolios. The extent of the credit contraction in countries B and C is 
then 20 ×  50 percent + 10 ×  11.1 percent = 11.1 percent and
20 ×  50 percent + 80 ×  11.1 percent = 18.8 percent, respectively, 
representing 11.1 percent /(20 + 10) = 37 percent and 18.8 percent /
(20 + 80) = 19 percent of their initial debts. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2000 11
A Synthesized View as Applied to Asia
Our discussion of the role of the banking and finance sectors 
and the international transmission of crises—two central 
aspects of the Asia crisis—has highlighted the fact that they 
encompass both the fundamental and self-fulfilling views of 
currency crises. This section suggests that the two views are 
ultimately complementary rather than opposing, and that their 
synthesis can help to create a comprehensive picture of recent 
episodes of turmoil in exchange rate markets.
Taken separately, each view offers an unsatisfactory 
explanation of the Asian events. Explanations based on the 
interactions between expectations and outcomes fail to 
account for the 1997 confidence crises and overlook the 
evidence of several factors that contributed to the deterioration 
of fundamentals in Asia well before the onset of the crisis. 
Moreover, explanations based on fundamentals cannot 
account for the unpredictability and severity of the crisis.
A synthesized approach combines the strengths of each view 
and stresses how they complement one another. Fundamental 
weaknesses leave countries at the mercy of sudden shifts in 
market sentiment, and confidence crises have devastating 
implications when they act as catalysts of ongoing processes.17 
Indeed, advocates of both the fundamental and the self-
fulfilling views agree in principle that a deteriorating economic 
outlook increases an economy’s vulnerability to a crisis. 
Whether or not the plunges in asset prices after the eruption of 
the event are driven by self-fulfilling expectations and investor 
panic, weak economic fundamentals are a crucial element in 
the genesis and spread of a crisis.
According to such a synthesized view, the Asia crisis 
resulted from the interaction between structural weaknesses 
and the volatility of the international capital markets. The 
relevance of fundamental imbalances is illustrated by the 
different experiences of several countries during the crisis. 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong were, relatively speaking, 
less affected by the regional turmoil. The Hong Kong currency 
parity was maintained despite strong speculative attacks. 
Taiwan and Singapore decided to let their currencies float 
rather than to lose reserves by trying to stabilize the exchange 
rate. The depreciation rates of their currencies were modest 
and, most important, they did not experience drastic reversals 
in market sentiment, financial panic, and large-scale debt 
crises.
These three countries shared a number of characteristics. 
Their trade and current account balances were in surplus in the 
1990s and their foreign debt was low (Taiwan was a net foreign 
creditor toward Bank for International Settlements banks). 
They had a relatively large stock of foreign exchange reserves 
compared with those of the crisis countries. Their financial and 
banking systems did not suffer from the same structural 
weaknesses and fragility observed in the crisis countries. And 
finally, they were perhaps less exposed to forms of so-called 
“crony capitalism” with intermingled interests among financial 
institutions, political leaders, and corporate elite. Conversely, 
the Asian countries that came under speculative attack in 1997 
—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South 
Korea—had the largest current account deficits throughout the 
1990s. Although the degree of real appreciation over the 1990s 
differed widely across Asian countries, all the currencies that 
crashed in 1997, with the important exception of Korea’s, had 
experienced a real appreciation (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 
1999b and Tornell 1999).
The major fundamental weakness of the Asian countries 
consisted of the exposed position of the banking and corporate 
sectors in an environment of limited prudential supervision. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the Asian miracle occurred 
despite significant distortions of the market mechanism in the 
financial sector. In the presence of extensive controls and limits 
on foreign borrowing, these distortions did not translate into 
high domestic vulnerability to external shocks. This key feature 
changed with the liberalization of financial markets in the early 
1990s, which provided Asian borrowers with access to inex-
pensive foreign funds (McKinnon and Pill 1997). Although 
international capital markets became progressively more 
accessible and domestic markets were deregulated, supervision 
of the financial system remained inadequate—the best-known 
example being provided by the strong, unregulated growth of 
financial companies in Thailand.
In such an environment of limited prudential supervision, 
financial intermediaries borrowed heavily in foreign currencies 
over short horizons, as the stability of the exchange rate and the 
perception of government guarantees contributed to a false 
sense of safety. The funds were then channeled to investment 
projects of questionable profitability. Domestic banks and 
foreign investors downplayed the riskiness of their positions, in 
part because the authorities were perceived as guarantors and 
in part because the stellar past economic performance provided 
The major fundamental weakness of the 
Asian countries consisted of the exposed 
position of the banking and corporate 
sectors in an environment of limited 
prudential supervision.12 The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion
the background for overly optimistic projections. The financial 
sector was therefore left with an increasing portfolio of 
nonperforming loans, financed by short-term foreign 
borrowing. The ensuing maturity and currency mismatch 
exposed the banks and the countries as a whole to reversals of 
capital flows.
As a result, even a small attack on a currency was bound to 
put a snowball mechanism in motion. The authorities’ ability 
to defend the exchange rate peg through higher interest rates 
was limited, as such rates would have jeopardized the financial 
and corporate sectors. They were then left with little choice but 
to allow the currency to depreciate.18 But the outcome was a 
sharp deterioration of financial institutions’  balance sheets 
and a surge in the domestic value of foreign debt, leading to the 
bankruptcy of several banks and firms. The fiscal cost of any 
bailout by the government in turn fueled the loss in investor 
confidence.
Conclusion
The central role of the financial sector has led to a reassessment 
of the optimal pace of financial liberalization, due to the 
necessity of setting up adequate supervisory and regulatory 
mechanisms—and being able to enforce them—as precon-
ditions for the removal of obstacles to international borrowing 
and lending. In terms of its lessons for future crisis prevention 
strategies, the Asian episode points especially to the need to 
prevent the accumulation of a large stock of foreign-currency-
denominated debt. It also emphasizes the need to control the 
magnitude of currency and maturity mismatches of the assets 
and liabilities of financial institutions and firms. Whether debt 
is held by the private or the public sector does not affect this 
conclusion, because the difference between the two categories 
blurs in crisis situations.Endnotes
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1. For recent studies focusing on the large-scale speculative episodes 
in the 1990s, see, for example, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and 
Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998a, 1998b) on the European 
Monetary System crisis of 1992-93; Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) 
and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) on the Mexican peso crisis of 1994; 
and  International Monetary Fund (1997, 1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini (1999a, 1999b), Mishkin (1999), and Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) on the Asia crisis of 1997-98.
2. The approach was pioneered by Krugman (1979), who adapted a 
model by Salant and Henderson (1978) to the analysis of currency 
crises. It was further refined by Flood and Garber (1984).
3. For an earlier presentation of these considerations, see Diaz-
Alejandro (1985). The contributions made by Dooley (1997) and 
McKinnon and Pill (1997) present an analysis along similar lines. For 
recent analytical models, see Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999a) 
and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1998).
4. The standard studies on self-fulfilling crises are Obstfeld (1986, 
1994).
5. For instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that problems in 
the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis, which in turn 
deepens the banking crisis.
6. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999) and Krugman (1999) point to 
another impact of a currency crisis on balance sheets: devaluation 
reduces the foreign currency value of the borrower’s collateral, thereby 
curtailing the country’s access to additional funding.
7. Weaknesses in the banking sector played a key role in crisis episodes 
preceding the Asian meltdown. In Mexico, the banking and financial 
system was fragile even before the peso crisis of 1994 (see Krueger and 
Tornell [1999]). The peso devaluation of 1994 increased the pressure 
on the banking system, leading to a crisis estimated to have accounted 
for about 14 to 20 percent of GDP.
8. The profitability of Asian firms indeed appears to have decreased on 
the eve of the crisis. For instance, the Korean conglomerates (chaebols) 
relied heavily on debt to finance low-return investments, leading to 
very low profits, if any (World Bank 1998). Similarly, a study of a wide 
sample of firms in the Asian countries by Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (1998) shows reduced profits on investments since the mid-
1990s.
9. See Krugman (1998), Mishkin (1999), and Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini (1999a).
10. Dooley (1997), and Chinn, Dooley, and Shrestha (1999) consider 
a model where the government cannot credibly commit not to use its 
reserves for an eventual bailout of the financial sector. Private agents 
then accumulate guaranteed assets in the country with the intention to 
redeem them eventually for government reserves. A crisis occurs when 
investors trade their assets for reserves.
11. Díaz-Alejandro (1985) highlights a similar problem underlying 
the financial crisis experienced by Chile during the process of 
deregulation and liberalization in the early 1980s.
12. Note that twin crises leave the authorities with a policy dilemma. 
If a currency comes under speculative attack, a defense of the exchange 
rate through an interest rate hike may be counterproductive, as higher 
interest rates contribute to the collapse of the weakened banking 
sector. However, if the country does not stabilize its exchange rate, a 
currency plunge worsens bank balance sheets and ultimately becomes 
a catalyst of further banking sector disruption.
13. The authors extend the banking crisis model developed by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to an open economy.
14. The provision of liquidity in a currency crisis poses a problem not 
faced in domestic bank runs. Both types of crises begin with a 
widespread attempt to convert short-term claims into currency. In a 
closed economy, the central bank can satisfy these claims by issuing (in 
principle) an unlimited supply of domestic currency. In an open 
economy, however, the central bank can only provide foreign 
currency up to the extent of its stock of foreign reserves. Furthermore, 
in a closed economy, a bank run can be ruled out with deposit 
insurance and access to the central bank discount window. In an open 
economy, the central bank may not have enough reserves to function 
as its lender of last resort; hence, the potential need exists for an 
international lender of last resort.
15. For studies stressing the role of trade linkages, see Eichengreen, 
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1998). Structural 
spillovers are at the core of the interpretation of the 1992-93 European 
Monetary System crisis by Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998a, 
1998b). A modern revisitation of the theory of competitive 
devaluations is provided by Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille 
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Endnotes (Continued)
16. A related model by Chari and Kehoe (1997) assumes that each 
potential investor observes an imperfect signal of the profitability of 
an investment project and decides whether to invest based on this 
signal and the investment decisions of other investors. This strategy 
can lead to an entrapment of information. If the first—in terms of 
observed behavior—agents decide not to invest, subsequent investors 
may infer that their predecessors received adverse signals and decide 
to refrain from the project, even if their own signal is positive. Several 
authors analyze whether financial markets are characterized by “pure” 
contagion, in the sense that changes in asset prices in a country have 
an effect on prices in other countries that cannot be explained by trade 
or common creditor links. The debate remains active as there is no 
compelling evidence that emerging markets have experienced such 
contagion (Baig and Goldfajn 1999; Brown, Goetzmann, and Park 
1998; Choe, Kho, and Stulz 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 1999).
17. Models with multiple equilibria show than an economy with 
strong fundamentals is not exposed to a crisis risk, whereas one with 
weak fundamentals is in a region of parameters where shifts in 
investors’ expectations can occur as rational phenomena. Morris and 
Shin (1998) show that the multiplicity of equilibria disappears if 
investors receive private signals of the state of fundamentals. Their 
approach provides the foundation for an endogenous theory of 
confidence crises.
18. It has been argued that currency crises and their adverse impact 
could be avoided by adopting more stringent forms of exchange rate 
pegging. An example is a currency board in which the entire monetary 
base is backed by foreign reserves. However, it is unclear whether such 
arrangements address the core problem. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
stress that currency crises reflect the unwillingness of the monetary 
authorities to incur the costs of defending the exchange rate peg, and 
not their inability to do so.References
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